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A Statistical Look at Roger Clemens’ Pitching Career
Abstract
A recent report (Hendricks Sports Management, LP, et al, 2008) issued by Hendricks Sports Management,
LP, claims to provide evidence for the lack of use of performance-enhancing substances (PESs) by Hallof-Fame caliber pitcher Roger Clemens, a claim based on an analysis of his career statistics (using ERA =
earned run average, K rate = strikeout rate, innings pitched), both in isolation and in comparison to other
power pitchers of his era (Randy Johnson, Nolan Ryan, and Curt Schilling).
In this research, we re-examine Roger Clemens’ career using a more complete and stable set of pitching
measures (WHIP = walks + hits per inning pitched, BAA = batting average against, ERA, BB rate = rate of
walks per batter faced, K rate), and by using a broader (census) comparison set of pitchers with similar
longevity in order to reduce the selection bias inherent in the Hendricks report. In contrast to Hendricks’
report, our analysis examines not only late career performance but also early- and mid-career trends. Our
findings can be summarized as follows:
Using simple quadratic functions, and an occasional spline to relate the above pitching measures to age,
we demonstrate a number of empirical regularities:

• Roger Clemens’ career is atypical with respect to his peer group. While most pitchers with
comparable longevity improve for the first half of their career, peaking just past the age of
30 and then declining (an inverted-U shape), Roger Clemens’ career statistics shows a
decrease into his early thirties followed by a marked improvement late in his career (more
of a U-shape).
• This pattern is consistent across most measures for Roger Clemens, yet for certain
measures is not unique to him. That is, other pitchers have atypical patterns as well for
some, but not all other tested measures.
Our analyses suggest what we, as statisticians, have postulated all along: empirical association is not
causation, and neither the Hendricks report nor ours can prove or disprove the use of PESs by any given
player. This is because players are indeed unique, and due to the short-time series and sparseness of
comparable players there is low power to assess specific hypotheses. However, our analyses clearly
suggest that Roger Clemens’ career pitching trajectory is atypical.
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Abstract
A recent report (Hendricks Sports Management, LP, et al, 2008) issued by
Hendricks Sports Management, LP, claims to provide evidence for the lack of use of
performance-enhancing substances (PESs) by Hall-of-Fame caliber pitcher Roger
Clemens, a claim based on an analysis of his career statistics (using ERA = earned run
average, K rate = strikeout rate, innings pitched), both in isolation and in comparison to
other power pitchers of his era (Randy Johnson, Nolan Ryan, and Curt Schilling).
In this research, we re-examine Roger Clemens’ career using a more complete
and stable set of pitching measures (WHIP = walks + hits per inning pitched, BAA =
batting average against, ERA, BB rate = rate of walks per batter faced, K rate), and by
using a broader (census) comparison set of pitchers with similar longevity in order to
reduce the selection bias inherent in the Hendricks report. In contrast to Hendricks’
report, our analysis examines not only late career performance but also early- and midcareer trends. Our findings can be summarized as follows:
Using simple quadratic functions, and an occasional spline to relate the above
pitching measures to age, we demonstrate a number of empirical regularities:
•

Roger Clemens’ career is atypical with respect to his peer group. While
most pitchers with comparable longevity improve for the first half of
their career, peaking just past the age of 30 and then declining (an
inverted-U shape), Roger Clemens’ career statistics shows a decrease
into his early thirties followed by a marked improvement late in his
career (more of a U-shape).

•

This pattern is consistent across most measures for Roger Clemens, yet
for certain measures is not unique to him. That is, other pitchers have
atypical patterns as well for some, but not all other tested measures.

Our analyses suggest what we, as statisticians, have postulated all along:
empirical association is not causation, and neither the Hendricks report nor ours can
prove or disprove the use of PESs by any given player. This is because players are
indeed unique, and due to the short-time series and sparseness of comparable players
there is low power to assess specific hypotheses. However, our analyses clearly suggest
that Roger Clemens’ career pitching trajectory is atypical.
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1. Introduction
Baseball is ‘America’s Pastime’ and with attendance and interest at an all-time
high, it is clear that baseball is a big business. Furthermore, many of the sport’s hallowed
records (the yearly home run record, the total home run record, the 500 home run club,
etc.) are being assailed and passed at a pace never before seen. Yet, due to the admitted
use and accusations documented in the “Mitchell report” (2007), of performance
enhancing substances (PES’s), the “shadow” (Fainaru-Wada and Williams, 2007) over
these accomplishments is receiving as much press, if not more, than the breaking of the
records themselves.

A particularly salient example comes from a recently released report by
Hendricks Sports Management, LP (Hendricks Sports Management, LP, et al) which led
to widespread national coverage. This report purported to demonstrate the innocence
from claims of PES use directed at Roger Clemens, one of baseball’s all-time highestperforming pitchers. Using well-established baseball statistics including ERA (number
of earned runs allowed per nine innings pitched) and K-rate (strikeout rate per nineinnings pitched), the report compares Roger Clemens’ career to those of other great
power pitchers of his era (Randy Johnson, Nolan Ryan, and Curt Schilling) and proclaims
that Roger Clemens’ career trajectory on these measures is not atypical. Based on this
finding, the report suggests that the pitching data themselves are not an indictment (nor
does it provide proof) of Clemens guilt; in fact, just the opposite.
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While we concur with the Hendricks report that a statistical analysis of Clemens’
career can provide prima facie ‘evidence’1, our approach provides a new look at his
career pitching trajectory using a broader set of measures as well as a broader comparison
set of pitchers. This is important as there has been a lot of recent research as to what are
the most reliable and stable measures of pitching performance (Albert, 2006) and our
attempt is to be inclusive in this regard. In Section 2, we provide a closer examination of
Clemens’ career with respect to these additional pitching measures.

Even more importantly, one of the pitfalls that all analyses of extraordinary
events (the immense success of Clemens as a pitcher) have is ‘right-tail self-selection’. If
one compares extraordinary players only to other extraordinary players, and selects that
set of comparison players based on their behavior on that extraordinary dimension, then
one does not obtain a representative (appropriate) comparison set. By focusing only on
pitchers who pitched effectively into their mid-forties, the Hendricks report minimized
the possibility that Clemens would look atypical. Here we use more reasonable criteria
for pitchers that are based on their longevity and the number of innings pitched in their
career to form the comparison set, rather than performance at any specific point in their
career.

The focus of this paper is an analysis of Clemens’ career using a more
sophisticated and comprehensive database which we describe in Section 3. Section 4
contains our analysis of this larger comparison set, which suggests that Roger Clemens’
1

It is important to point out that neither the Hendricks report nor this one can prove or disprove the guilt or
innocence of any player based on data alone. Rather, statistics can provide a lens through which we can
compare a focal player to other comparable sets of players.
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performance is very atypical along these dimensions. We conclude in Section 5 with a
set of prescriptive advice for those who wish to perform similar analyses.
2. A Closer Look at the Career of Roger Clemens
Before we begin our full analysis and discussion, we first take a closer look at
Clemens’ entire career. To be sure, this unavoidable act of data “snooping” was part of
our research method, and it is instructive to unfold our insights in the order in which they
actually occurred. For the average fan, the most salient measures of success are winning
percentage and ERA, which are a good place to start.
Figure 1a: Clemens’ Winning Percentage over Time

Figure 1b: Clemens’ ERA over Time
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What these graphs show is that Clemens quickly established himself as a star and in the
early 1990s he lost his “relative” luster. His final 4 years with the Red Sox were
certifiably mediocre (compared to his history), so much so that the future Hall of Famer
was considered to be in the “twilight of his career” (Dan Duquette quoted in Silverman,
1996). However, as our graph clearly demonstrates, Clemens recovered and climbed to
new heights at the comparatively old age of 35. His last few years showed a second
period of decline.
Now any ‘well-read’ student of baseball understands that winning percentage and
ERA (Earned Run Average) are fairly noisy measures of quality. Both measures are
readily affected by factors outside a pitcher’s ability, such as fielding and the order in
which batting events occur. Additionally, winning percentage depends critically on run
support. Analysts who specialize in pitching evaluation, instead use measures of
component events2, such as rates of Strike Outs (K) and Walks (BB). We graph the career
trajectory of K rate and BB rate for Roger Clemens below:
Figure 2: Clemens’ K rate and BB rate over Time

2

For example, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baseball_statistics#Pitching_statistics.
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Again we see Clemens’ strong start, a gradual decline in BB rate as he entered the “firsttwilight” of his career, followed by a marked improvement. His strikeout rate improved
in his early career and then suddenly declined and then rose again peaking at age of 35 in
1998 in his second year with Toronto.

To put these career trajectories in an appropriate context, we require a comparison
group. Our first effort (but not our last) was a handful of star-level contemporaries,
including Greg Maddux, Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling, whose career trajectories on
these statistics are graphed below:
Figure 3: Greg Maddux K rate and BB rate over Time

Figure 4: Randy Johnson K rate and BB rate over Time
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Figure 5: Curt Schilling K rate and BB rate over Time

The career trajectories for all three of these star contemporaries of Clemens are nicely fit
with quadratic curves. In terms of performance, the curves clearly show steady
improvement as they entered their primes followed by a marked decline in their strikeout
rate and a leveling off in their walk rates.

The contrast with Clemens’ career trajectory is quite stark. The second act for
Clemens is unusual when compared to these other greats because his later success
follows such an unprecedented period of decline. This leaves us with the following
question: how unusual is it for a durable pitcher to have suffered a mid-career decline and
then recovery?
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3. Database Construction

In order to perform our statistical analyses, we first obtained data from the
Lahman Database, Version 5.5 (www.baseball1.com) on all major league baseball
pitchers, and their associated statistics, whose careers were contained in the years 19692007. The starting year of 1969 was selected because of the change in the height of the
pitchers’ mound (Vescey, 1968), which launched the ‘modern era’ in baseball. From that
set of pitchers, we constructed a comparison set of all durable starting pitchers by looking
at all pitchers who played at least 15 years (with 10 or more games started per year) and
had at least 3000 innings pitched.3 There were thirty-one pitchers besides Roger Clemens
that fit these criteria. All of these starting pitchers therefore had comparably long careers
(in years) and innings pitched similar to Roger Clemens, and hence were a relevant
comparison set; albeit others could certainly be chosen. Appendix 1 gives the names and
a set of descriptive statistics for the 31 players and Clemens.

For each of these pitchers, we looked at the following well-established pitching
statistics for each of the years in which they pitched:

[1] WHIP = Walks + Hits per inning pitched;
[2] BAA = Batting average for hitters when facing the given pitcher;
[3] ERA = Earned run average per nine innings pitched;
[4] BB Rate = Walk rate;

3

Sensitivity analyses run that included minor perturbations in these criterion indicated that the results are
quite stable.
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[5] K rate = Batter strike out rate per plate appearance (not including walks)

Together, these statistics provide a fairly complete picture of the career trajectory for a
starting pitcher. We describe next in Section 4 a set of analyses we performed on the
data.

4. Trajectory Analyses

In order to understand and summarize the trajectory that each of the five (j = 1,
…J=5) aforementioned statistics take, for each of the thirty-two (i =1, .., I = 32) focal
pitchers (including Clemens), we fit a quadratic function to each pitcher’s data at year t as
follows:

S ijt = β 0ij + β1ij Ageit + β 2ij Ageit2 + ε ijt

[1]

where S ijt = value of statistic j for pitcher i in their t-th season, Ageit = age of pitcher i in
their t-th major league season, β 0ij , β 1ij , and β 2ij are an intercept and coefficients
describing how Age and Age2 influence the prediction of the statistics, and ε ijt is a
randomly distributed normal error term.4 We acknowledge that a quadratic curve may not
be the best model for every pitcher’s career, including Roger Clemens. However, the

4

As none of these statistics were near boundaries, taking transformations to make the normal residual error
more plausible had little impact.
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quadratic curve is a simple model with interpretable coefficients that provide a common
basis of comparison for all pitchers in our study.

Our primary interest centers around the coefficient β 2ij which describes whether the
pitchers trajectory for that statistic is purely linear as they age ( β 2ij = 0), “hump-shaped”
( β 2ij <0) or ”U-shaped” ( β 2ij >0). To provide some context around this, one might
predict the following patterns, corresponding a priori to a pitcher hitting a mid-career
“prime” and then falling off near the end of his career.

[1] WHIP ( β 2ij >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 31 5).
[2] BAA ( β 2ij >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 29)
[3] ERA ( β 2ij >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 29)
[4] BB Rate ( β 2ij >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 33)
[5] K rate ( β 2ij <0 and career low = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 29).

Note the sign change for K rate for β 2ij as more strikeouts is better, while a lower value
for the other statistics is better. Figures 6A and 6B below contain a more detailed analysis
of the data from the Hendricks report, using ERA. We first present in Figure 6a the ERA
curves for the 32 relevant players (31 pitchers + Clemens). Each individual trajectory is
depicted with a gray curve, except for Clemens who has a red curve. Also given is a
black curve which is the quadratic trajectory fit to the data for all 31 players except
5

We report the empirically estimated values here out of interest.
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Clemens. Figure 6b contains the players with curves that have quadratic terms which are
“atypical” ( β 2ij ≤ 0) compared to the prior hypothesis of a mid-career prime. Six players,
including Clemens, have these atypical curves, and in fact Clemens’ curve looks quite
atypical even within this subset of six players

Figure 6A Figure 6B

Figures 7A and 7B below contain career trajectories of WHIP for the same 32 players.
Roger Clemens is again within a small subset of seven pitchers that show atypical career
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paths. Further inspection of his WHIP curve suggests that he was the only pitcher to get
worse as his career went on and then improve at the end of his career.
Figure 7A Figure 7B

Two additional analyses we performed using ERA and WHIP were to compute
the same figures as Figures 6 and 7, but instead using ERA margin and WHIP margin,
defined as the difference between the individual ERA and the league average. In
Appendix 2, we show the ERA margin and WHIP margin curves for Roger Clemens and
for the average over the 31 other pitchers, and we see little difference between the raw
curves (Figures 6 and 7) and the margin curves.
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Figures 8A and 8B below contain career trajectories of BB rate (Walks per Batter
Faced) for the same 32 players. For BB rate, we note that there are 10 pitchers who have
‘inverted-U’ fits to their data with Clemens being one of them. Furthermore, the
“steepness” of his improvement is particularly noticeable in the later years, even amongst
this set of 10.
Figure 8A

Figure 8B

There are several pitching measures for which Clemens’ career trajectory does not
look atypical, which is the central assertion of the Hendricks report. In Figures 9A and
9B below, we give the strikeout rate (K per non-BB batters faced) for each of the 32
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durable starting pitchers. Clemens does have an overall higher K rate than most pitchers
in this set, but his career trajectory follows a similar shape ( β 2ij <0) to 24 of the other 31
players at least with respect to the quadratic fit.
Figure 9A Figure 9B

In Figures 10A and 10B below, we examine BAA (Batting Average Against) for
each of the 32 pitchers. Similar to K rate, we again observe that Clemens has a typical
shape to his career trajectory to most (24 out of 31) of these other starting pitchers, albeit
his curve is somewhat flatter.
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Figure 10A Figure 10B

5. Summary Conclusions

Through the use of simple exploratory curve fitting applied to a number of
pitching statistics, and for a well-defined set of long-career pitchers, we assessed whether
Roger Clemens pitching trajectories were atypical. Our evidence is suggestive that while
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most long-term pitchers have peaked mid-career and decline thereafter, Roger Clemens
(for some key statistics) worsened mid-career and improved thereafter.

So, what can we conclude? We can conclude that his pitching career was
statistically atypical for long-term pitchers in terms of WHIP, BB rate and ERA, and in
particular, Clemens shows an end-of-career improvement that is rarely seen. The data
does not exonerate (nor indict) Roger Clemens, since an exploratory statistical analysis of
this type never proves innocence or guilt. After analyzing this data set there are at least
as many questions remaining as before.
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Appendix 1: Durable Starting Pitchers (1968-2007)
Name
Doyle Alexander
Vida Blue
Bert Blyleven
Kevin Brown
Steve Carlton
Roger Clemens
Chuck Finley
Tom Glavine
Orel Hershiser
Fergie Jenkins
Randy Johnson
Tommy John
Jerry Koosman
Greg Maddux
Denis Martinez
Jack Morris
Jamie Moyer
Mike Mussina
Joe Niekro
Phil Neikro
Jim Palmer
Gaylord Perry
Rick Reuschel
Jerry Ruess
Nolan Ryan
Curt Schilling
Tom Seaver
John Smoltz
Don Sutton
Frank Tanana
Bob Welch
David Wells

Number of
Years

First Year

Last Year

Innings Pitched

18
15
21
17
20
24
15
20
15
16
18
21
18
21
20
16
20
17
16
20
15
16
17
20
26
16
19
15
21
20
16
18

1971
1971
1970
1989
1968
1984
1988
1988
1984
1968
1989
1968
1968
1987
1977
1979
1986
1991
1968
1968
1969
1968
1972
1970
1968
1992
1968
1988
1968
1974
1978
1990

1989
1986
1992
2005
1987
2007
2002
2007
1999
1983
2007
1989
1985
2007
1996
1994
2007
2007
1987
1987
1983
1983
1990
1989
1993
2007
1986
2007
1988
1993
1993
2007

3261
3263
4950
3228
4938
4917
3060
4300
3072
4015
3768
4011
3817
4783
3832
3672
3519
3362
3201
5057
3581
4281
3517
3655
5383
3116
4532
3082
4824
4162
3023
3259
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Appendix 2: ERA and WHIP Margin Curves
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